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Abstract 
This paper examines the role of uncertainty in the context of the business cycle in the euro area. To gain a more granular 
perspective on uncertainty, the paper decomposes uncertainty along two dimensions: First, we construct the four 
different moments of uncertainty, including the point estimate, the standard deviation, the skewness and the kurtosis. 
The second dimension of uncertainty spans along three distinct groups of economic agents, including consumers, 
corporates and financial markets. Based on this taxonomy, we construct uncertainty indices and assess the impact on 
real GDP via impulse response functions and further investigate their informational value in rolling out-of-sample GDP 
forecasts. The analysis lends evidence to the hypothesis that higher uncertainty expressed through the point estimate, a 
larger standard deviation among confidence estimates, positive skewness and a higher kurtosis are all negatively 
correlated with the business cycle. The impulse response functions reveal that in particular the first and the second 
moment of uncertainty cause a permanent effect on GDP with an initial decline and a subsequent overshoot. We find 
uncertainty in the corporate sector to be the main driver behind this observation, followed by financial markets‟ 
uncertainty whose initial effect on GDP is comparable but receding much faster. While the first two moments of 
uncertainty improve GDP forecasts significantly, both the skewness and the kurtosis do not augment the forecast quality 
any further. 
JEL Classification: D8, E23, E27, E32, E37. 
Keywords: uncertainty, Euro area, business cycle, GDP forecast, VAR 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the role of uncertainty in the context of business cycle dynamics in the euro 
area. There is consensus in existing literature that uncertainty among economic agents has a measurable effect on real 
economic variables. However, researchers seem to be divided on the question of how to define uncertainty, which 
ultimately determines its measurement and quantification. Concepts of uncertainty range from observable measures 
such as implied volatilities on financial markets and sentiment indices on the one end of the spectrum to Knightian 
uncertainty (Knight, 1921) on the other end, aspiring to observe the unobservable. To bridge the gap between these 
different ideas about uncertainty, this paper first decomposes uncertainty into different layers along the four moments of 
the distribution: We define the first moment as the general confidence level that economic agents state explicitly in 
surveys or implicitly via financial market risk premia. The second, third and fourth moment of uncertainty focuses on 
the shape of the distribution of confidence estimates and implied volatilities in terms of the standard deviation, the 
skewness and the kurtosis. To capture uncertainty holistically for the economy, we consider three types of economic 
groups: the consumer, corporates and financial markets. Subsequently, we construct aggregate measures of uncertainty 
across these agents for the four moments and qualitatively assess their behavior vis-à-vis the business cycle. A second 
area of interest is the quantitative impact of uncertainty on GDP considering a parsimonious specification of the 
business cycle in a VAR. The third perspective focuses on the informative value that the different moments of 
uncertainty provide to GDP forecasts. We subsequently validate results of the third perspective by examining how much 
of the variation in the second moment of uncertainty is actually driven by the first moment. 
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This paper has the following structure. The second section provides a literature review covering the three economic 
groups and the four moments of uncertainty. The third section presents the model set-up and the underlying data of the 
analysis. The fourth section analyzes the shape of uncertainty vis-à-vis the business cycle from a qualitative perspective 
and continues with a quantitative analysis on the impact of uncertainty on real GDP via impulse response functions. 
Section five assesses the informational value of the four moments in the context of their forecasting performance on real 
GDP. To account for potential endogeneity, this section concludes with an analysis that sheds light on the relationship 
between the first and the second moment of the distribution. Section six concludes with a brief summary. 
2. Literature Review 
The relevant breeding places of uncertainty can be broadly classified into three groups of agents whose activities 
ultimately affect the real economy. At the very core of these inherently unobservable dynamics are consumers and 
corporations who determine the demand and the supply side of the economy. Both economic agents can develop 
uncertainty for a multiple of endogenous reasons related to the current stance of the business cycle. Representing a third 
group, financial market participants and their lack of confidence can create exogenous shocks on consumers and 
corporations alike through changes in financial conditions. As the actual interplay between these three economic groups 
is very nuanced without clear-cut causality, this sections sheds light on each representative agent separately. 
Subsequently, we review findings on the different moments of uncertainty and their informational value regarding the 
business cycle. 
2.1 Consumers 
Households form expectations about several interdependent variables that determine in aggregation their course of 
action. These expectations cover the macroeconomic perspective (e.g. general economic situation, price trends) and the 
individual outlook (e.g. personal financial position, employment status, income situation and major purchases). 
Increasing uncertainty in these areas affects two transmission channels: The timing and the composition of consumption 
spending. According to most lifecycle models of consumption, a higher level of uncertainty has long been associated 
with higher levels of precautionary savings to self-insure through a delay of consumption (Deaton (1991), Caballero 
(1991)), even though some studies have casted doubts on this causality (Dynan 1993). Christelis et al. (2016) analyze 
the motives behind changes in savings based on a sample of Dutch households. While previous empirical research has 
predominantly used ex-post consumption as an input factor into the Euler equation, the authors sidestep potential 
questions of endogeneity by referring to consumption expectations and can confirm strong precautionary savings in the 
presence of uncertainty.  
The second transmission mechanism of consumer uncertainty is a change in the composition of purchases. However, 
literature is less conclusive on the proposed causality. Proponents of this channel argue that consumers will delay 
spending on durables caused by temporary income uncertainty. Romer (1990) notes that during the period of the Great 
Depression in 1929, consumption of durables has declined while spending on non-durables has increased.1 Contrary to 
her findings, research on the post-war era finds a negative relationship between income uncertainty and spending on 
non-durables based on survey data (Hahm and Steigerwald (1999), Madsen and McAleer (2000)).  
2.2 Corporations 
The effects of uncertainty surrounding the business outlook of corporations are weighing ultimately on the real 
economy from two different angles: Investments in capital goods and hiring decisions, the later feeding into consumer 
uncertainty. First, investment spending requires decision makers to assess the confidence level of their forecasts. 
According to the „wait-and-see‟ effect, companies could opt to defer an investment decision until an updated set of 
information increases their confidence. Bernanke (1983) provides theoretical foundation that it is reasonable for 
companies to defer irreversible investments in the light of uncertainty, if the value of the information gained by waiting 
exceeds the costs of postponing a decision. In a model of risk-neutral agents in an energy-importing economy, Bernanke 
shows that uncertainty increases the value of incoming information which increases, in turn, the benefits of waiting. 
Hence, uncertainty depresses investments in the short-run and contributes to business cycle fluctuations. Pindyck (1991) 
argues that the „wait-and-see‟ effect needs consideration when dealing with the future value of objects, which are 
inherently difficult to value. A wilderness area, for example, requires an adequate stochastic modeling of its value 
before starting its economic exploitation. In fact, the option value of waiting should be added as a foregone opportunity 
expressed as direct costs to the destruction of the wilderness area. Stokey (2016) develops a model of investment 
decisions where a change in tax policy induces corporations into a „wait-and-see mode‟. After gaining full insights into 
the newly introduced fiscal legislation, companies undertake the postponed, irreversible investment projects which lead 
to a temporary investment boom. While Bachmann et al. (2013) confirm in an SVAR that uncertainty shocks can create 
                                                        
1 Romer (1990) uses stock market volatility as a proxy for uncertainty. 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 7, No. 6; 2020 
3 
 
protracted negative impulses on economic activity, they emphasize the possibility of a reverse causality. In fact, the 
authors discuss the idea that uncertainty is not an autonomous source of economic fluctuations, but rather a result of a 
negative first moment shock in the economy. Their analysis is based on business surveys from the US and Germany 
covering manufacturing firms2 by modeling the ex-ante dispersion and the realized forecast errors.                                                                                           
Regarding the second transmission channel, hiring decisions under uncertainty are likely to impact both the demand 
side, through the purchasing power of consumers, and the supply side of an economy, through the size of production 
capacity. As turning points of economic cycles are inherently difficult to predict, firms could seek for a fuller set of 
information before changing the level of their workforce in the presence of inhibiting labor market regulation. Arellano 
et al. (2011) establish a general equilibrium model that incorporates employment decisions of heterogenous firms under 
imperfect financial markets. Firms are facing the trade-off between increasing returns as a function of labour and higher 
risk of default in case of demand shocks. According to the authors, a higher variance of expected aggregate demand 
leads to a fall in employment. Along similar lines, Ernst and Viegelahn (2014) develop an indicator reflecting hiring 
uncertainty among employers. Based on a modified investment model of McDonald and Siegel (1986), the authors 
determine two labour productivity thresholds at which firms start to hire or lay off workers facing a return and cost 
trade-off. The authors infer the level of hiring uncertainty based on a function of the actual hiring decisions by firms 
incorporating the observed labour productivity level within the economy. Results lend support to the hypothesis that 
labour markets play a crucial transmission mechanism of uncertainty. Despite the general notion in literature to connote 
uncertainty with a dampening effect, there is theoretical support for the opposite idea that uncertainty can actually 
increase hiring and investment through growth options and the Oi-Hartman-Abel effect3. While the idea of growth 
options refers to the upside potential of entering new product or regional markets providing a positive skew of potential 
returns, the Oi-Hartman-Abel effect relies on the assumption that profits are convex in costs and demand. Assuming that 
firms are able to increase and decrease production on the basis of a new information set, demand or cost uncertainty 
actually increase potential profits. 
2.3 Financial Markets 
Uncertainty among financial market participants can affect both the supply and the demand side of the economy 
through changes in financial conditions. However, the causality between uncertainty and a change in financial 
conditions often remains ambiguous: On the one hand, uncertainty can originally emerge within financial markets 
creating an exogenous shock that leads to tightening of financial conditions and a subsequent slump in investment and 
consumption. On the other hand, uncertainty could act as an amplification mechanism of the endogenous business cycle 
when financial markets react to an updated set of information about changing economic conditions. The related 
adjustment of risk premia could open a feedback channel in response to already existing economic dynamics. Gilchrist 
et al. (2014) establish a general equilibrium model and use micro and macro-level data to analyze the effect of 
innovations in credit spreads on investments. According to their model incorporating financial frictions, an increase in 
uncertainty leads to a sharp and persistent widening of credit spreads that cause corporations to cut investment spending 
and decrease their leverage. The authors highlight the significance of financial risk premia as a primary source for a 
decline in investments and cast doubts on the relative importance of the „wait-and-see‟ effect. Given their high 
frequency and availability, volatility indices of equity markets have been a preferred measure of uncertainty (Bekaert et 
al. (2013)) and served for benchmarking purposes of alternative uncertainty measures (Leduc and Liu (2016)). 
Caggiano et al. (2017) use the VXO4 as the dummy variable within a non-linear VAR model to analyze whether 
uncertainty is state-contingent based on U.S. data. Their results point to a larger effect of uncertainty during recessions 
with a sharp drop and subsequent recovery of unemployment and output. In expansionary phases, real economic 
variables react to a much lesser degree to an uncertainty shock with only limited evidence for overshooting. 
2.4 Shape of Uncertainty 
As researchers tend to define uncertainty in their specific own ways without converging to a broadly shared concept, we 
first categorize the various approaches along the different moments of the distribution: the point estimate, the standard 
deviation, the skewness and the kurtosis. The most direct way of gaining an estimate about the level of uncertainty 
within the economy is to address uncertainty via surveys which represents the most observable component of 
uncertainty. Emerging new technologies for the screening of large datasets have provided researchers with new 
perspectives on point estimates of uncertainty in addition to more traditional surveys. Baker et al. (2016) published a 
                                                        
2 The surveys are the German IFO Business Climate Survey and the Philadelphia Fed‟s Business Outlook Survey. 
3 The idea can be attributed to work by Oi (1961), Hartman (1972) and Abel (1983). 
4 The authors acknowledge that the VXO, a measure of volatility of the S&P 100, capture a mixture between risk and 
uncertainty. 
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policy uncertainty index based on the screening of 12,000 newspaper articles for a specified word combination. This 
concept relies on the idea that journalists represent a qualitative filter that adequately reflects the level of uncertainty of 
economic decision makers. The obvious limitations to this approach is the ex-post selection of keywords and the 
reliance on the media to capture uncertainty in their writings.  
A second stream of literature considers a measure related to the second moment of the distribution. A larger standard 
deviation is commonly interpreted as increasing uncertainty. Haddow et al. (2013) include amongst other variables 
implied volatility levels and dispersion among forecasters (GDP, company earnings) as input factors into their 
uncertainty index for the UK. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) propose a modified version of a VaR to detect systemic 
stress. The authors establish a VaR conditional on a financial institution being under distress relative to its median state 
and identify leverage, size, and asset price booms as predictors for periods of systemic risk. Representing another 
perspective through the lens of the standard deviation, Rossi and Sekhposyan (2015) consider forecast error 
distributions to infer the degree of uncertainty.  
Literature that explicitly considers the third and the fourth moment, the skewness and the kurtosis, is most prominent in 
financial market literature given sufficient availability of price data, whereas fewer studies look at economic variables 
as well. Ferreira (2018) measures the skewness of cross-sectional stock market returns for financial firms in the US and 
finds superior predictive power as compared to other aggregate uncertainty measures of aggregate uncertainty (Jurado et 
al. (2015)) or corporate bond spreads (e.g. Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)). Based on data from 1926 to 2015, Ferreira 
(2018) highlights that financial firms diversify away non-systemic risks through asset portfolio choices and their returns 
provide a useful signal that bridges the gap between financial market valuation and real economic dynamics. Guvenen 
et al. (2015) analyze individual labor earnings for the US and find strong deviation from lognormality in the presence of 
earnings shocks. In particular, results show significant negative skewness and high kurtosis in times of economic 
distress. Moreover, asymmetries between income cohorts and stages of the life-cycle arise as negative earnings shocks 
show higher negative skewness for older people given lower upside surprises and higher disaster risk. 
3. Model Set-Up and Data  
The conceptual framework of this paper is to deconstruct what is commonly perceived as uncertainty along two 
dimensions: different moments of uncertainty and different economic agents.  
3.1 Moments of Uncertainty 
One of the challenges that researchers are facing in their attempt to capture uncertainty is to clearly differentiate 
between the different moments. In particular, the overlap between sentiment, the general confidence level and less 
observable components of uncertainty is a source of ambiguity. Hence, we employ four different moments: The first 
moment is the point estimate related to the general confidence level which is directly observable in surveys and market 
risk premia; the second moment represents the standard deviation around this point estimate; the third moment 
measures the skewness; and the fourth moment captures the kurtosis. To quantify these measures, the analysis identifies 
confidence surveys for the consumer and the corporate sector which include data for various subsectors.5 This 
procedure allows for calculating the latter moments of the distribution based on the same dataset to achieve consistency 
with the first moment. 
The first moment is defined as the average confidence level of the different subsectors. To facilitate the interpretation, 
we standardize and invert the time series. Hence, an increase of the index points to higher uncertainty.  
The second moment, the standard deviation, is included to describe the overall dispersion of expectations according to 









                                                                                   [1] 
 
N describes the number of observations; A denotes the respective value of the subsector; and μ describes the mean 
which coincides with the first moment.6 We assume that a wider distribution of confidence levels is indicative of a 
more uncertain prognosis. As economic agents do not form expectations in isolation, a higher dispersion of forecasts 
                                                        
5 The procedure for financial markets deviates slightly given different type of data. 
6 This nomenclature applies for the other formulas as well. 
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within a group of economic agents will likely lower their confidence in their own point estimates.  
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If the shape of the distribution displays a longer tail to the right, skewness is considered to be positive. If a distribution 
is described by a longer tail to the left, skewness is negative. We examine whether outliers, that gather systematically on 
one of the ends of the distribution, carry informational value vis-à-vis the business cycle. Our hypothesis is that during 
periods of confidence, corporates and consumers gather around the average point estimate with negative outliers to the 
left, creating a negative skew. Following Keynes‟ animal spirits, we interpret behavior of economic agents as 
pro-cyclical. Hence, a benign economic outlook will cause survey respondents to herd around higher levels in 
confidence indices with less room for positive outliers and more room for pessimists who, speaking in statistical terms, 
pull the mean below the median. In times of higher uncertainty, however, point estimates will shift to the left and 
eliminate the left skew with outliers emerging on the right. Bernhardt et al. (2006) develop a robust frequency test for 
herding behavior based on quarterly individual forecasts of professional analysts on earnings-per-share (EPS) 
announcements for the period between 1989 and 2001. The authors find that analysts systematically overshoot actual 
EPS in nearly 60% of the cases which lends support to our hypothesis that good economic times lead to a majority of 
forecasts gathering around overly optimistic levels creating room for outliers to the downside and corresponding 
negative skewness. 














2                                                                                         [3] 
 
The standard normal distribution is described by a value of 3. If a distribution is rather equally distributed around the 
point estimate, platykurtic, it displays thinner tails (values below 3). A peaked distribution is called leptokurtic, with 
higher consensus around the central estimate and fatter tails (values above 3). We assume that a leptokurtic distribution 
represents situations of high consensus among the majority of economic agents with more extreme outliers on both ends. 
Thus, we suspect binary events with diverging views on the extremes and herding behavior in the center to produce a 
leptokurtic shape. As kurtosis represents a latter moment, we are cautious to not interpret it on an isolated basis but 
rather in an integrated perspective together with the point estimate, the standard deviation and the skewness. 
3.2 Economic Agents 
We determine the point estimate, the standard deviation, the skewness and the kurtosis for the following economic 
groups: consumers, corporates and financial market participants. The dataset for the euro area spans from the 
introduction of the euro in January 1999 until June 2018 and applies a quarterly perspective. 
Data on the consumer group is based on the European Commission Business and Consumer Survey7 that considers 
currently more than 41,000 consumers across the European Union8. For this study, we identify six strictly forward 
looking survey questions9 that assess expectations among consumers over the next 12mths on following perspectives: 
their financial situation, the general economic situation, unemployment expectations, future savings, major purchases 
and price trends. Each of these variables is provided for four different income cohorts which provides a total of 24 time 
series which we standardize (see Table 1a). We then determine the four moments of uncertainty across the different 
                                                        
7 We assume that uncertainty in the broader European Union and the euro area is largely congruent as the largest 
contributors to GDP (except for the UK) are members of both communities. 
8 To achieve comparability, national statistics institutes use a harmonized questionnaire and a common timetable. 
9 We exclude variables that ask about the current state and past observations. 
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time series for each point in time. The afore-mentioned variables are almost entirely positively correlated10 after 
changing the sign of the outlook on unemployment. Hence, dispersion does not arise due to a change in direction of the 
point estimate. As the main hypothesis, we assume that greater variation within the dataset at a particular point in time 
across different questions and income cohorts is a sign for increasing uncertainty among consumers. While this 
assumption may be vulnerable to fundamental factors that drive a wedge between different types of expectations, we 
claim that the representative consumer cannot rationally adjust his outlook consistently across all items causing 
differences on the relative stance of each time series. 
 
Table 1a. Data on the Consumer 
Data series Data period 
EA19: Fin Situation Next 12 Mo: Income 1st Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Gen Eco Situation Next 12 Mo: Income 1st Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Unemp Exp Next 12 Mo: Income 1st Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Savings Next 12 Mo: Income 1st Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Major Purchases Next 12 Mo: Income 1st Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Price Trends Next 12 Mo: Income 1st Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Fin Situation Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Gen Eco Situation Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Unemp Exp Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Savings Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Major Purchases Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Price Trends Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Fin Situation Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Gen Eco Situation Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Unemp Exp Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Savings Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Major Purchases Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Price Trends Next 12 Mo: Income 2nd Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Fin Situation Next 12 Mo: Income 4th Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Gen Eco Situation Next 12 Mo: Income 4th Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Unemp Exp Next 12 Mo: Income 4th Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Savings Next 12 Mo: Income 4th Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Major Purchases Next 12 Mo: Income 4th Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Price Trends Next 12 Mo: Income 4th Quartile, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
1st Moment of Uncertainty: Average 
2nd Moment of Uncertainty: Standard Deviation 
3rd Moment of Uncertainty: Skew 
4th Moment of Uncertainty: Kurtosis 
Source: European Commission Business and Consumer Survey 
 
On the corporate sector, we again consider survey data by the European Commission Business and Consumer Survey that 
is surveying 130,000 firms to infer the confidence levels of various industries11. For our analysis, we identify subsectors 
whose time series reaches back to the start of the EMU and exclude overlapping categories. The calculation of the different 
moments is then conducted across 27 standardized time series at a particular point in time (see Table 1b). Given integrated 
supply chains, companies do not conduct their forecasting processes in isolation. Hence, we interpret a greater divergence 







                                                        
10 95.1% of covariances of the 24 time series are positive. 
11 The survey differs between countries and covers expectations on production, exports, hiring activity and the broader 
business sentiment.  
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Table 1b. Data on the Corporate Sector 
Data Series Data period 
EA19: Consumer Goods: Confidence Indicator, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Investment Goods: Confidence Indicator, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Intermed Goods, ex Mining/Quarrying: Confidence Indicator, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Food And Bev: Confidence Indicator, Balance (SA, %) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Textiles: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Wearing Apparel: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Leather & Related Products: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Wood Products: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Paper Products: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Reproduction of Media: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Chemicals: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Rubber & Plastic Products: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Non-Metallic Mineral Products: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Basic Metals: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Fabricated Metal Products: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Electronic & Optical Products: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Electrical Equipment: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Machinery & Equipment: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Motor Vehicles & Trailers: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Furniture: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Other Manufacturing: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Trade & Repair of Motor Vehicles: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Sale of Motor Vehicles: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Motor Vehicles & Accessories: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Retail Trade, Excl Motor Vehicles: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Retail Sale of Food/Beverages/Tobacco: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EA19: Retail Sale of Other Goods: Confidence Indicator (SA, % Bal) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
1st Moment of Uncertainty: Average 
2nd Moment of Uncertainty: Standard Deviation 
3rd Moment of Uncertainty: Skew 
4th Moment of Uncertainty: Kurtosis 
Source: European Commission Business and Consumer Survey 
 
Regarding financial market data, the paper deviates from the previous procedure given the different nature of available 
data (see Table 1c). For the first moment, we refer deliberately to a parsimonious representation through the 
option-adjusted spread (OAS) on EUR denominated corporate bonds. According to existing literature, the OAS has the 
ability to capture investors‟ confidence in the current business cycle. Gilchrist et al. (2014) emphasize that changes in 
credits spread are the primary driver of the business cycle. The inclusion of the credit spread as the first moment should 
provide insights into the discussion of how much of uncertainty can be attributed to the general confidence on credit 
markets and what is caused by the less observable parts of uncertainty expressed as the latter moments. For the standard 
deviation, skewness and kurtosis, the study uses option implied volatilities of three segments: different asset classes 
(equity, rates and gold as a store of value), FX market (currency pairs versus the EUR to reflect flight-to-safety 
dynamics and fundamental trade flows) and commodities (energy, industrial and agriculture). To ensure data 
consistency among the various dimensions, we refer wherever possible to the 3m option implied volatility and convert 
daily values into quarterly observations via their average over the quarter. For the calculation of the second moment, we 
take the weighted average of the implied option values across the time series as soon as they become available given 
different starting dates. The third and fourth moment looks at the skewness12 and kurtosis of the standardized implied 






                                                        
12 We assume that positive skewness indicates increasing concerns about an upcoming spike in volatility. 
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Table 1c. Data on Financial Markets 
Data Series Data period 
V2X Index (VIX) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
V1X Index (DAX Volatility) Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
VCAC Index (CAC Volatility) Q1/2000 – Q2/2018 
10yr Rates Volatility Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
XAUUSDV3M Curncy (Store of Value - Gold) Q2/2002 – Q2/2018 
EURUSDV3M Curncy Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EURJPYV3M Curncy Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
EURAUDV3M Curncy Q1/2000 – Q2/2018 
EURCADV3M Curncy Q1/2005 – Q2/2018 
EURGBPV3M Curncy Q1/1999 – Q2/2018 
IVOLCRUD Index (Energy) Q4/2005 – Q2/2018 
IVOLNATG Index (Energy) Q4/2005 – Q2/2018 
IVOLCCOP Index (Industrial) Q4/2005 – Q2/2018 
XAGUSDV3M Curncy (Industrial) Q2/2002 – Q2/2018 
IVOLCORN Index (Agriculture) Q4/2005 – Q2/2018 
1st Moment of Uncertainty: Corporate OAS based on Barcalys EUR AGG Corporate 
2nd Moment of Uncertainty: Standard Deviation 
3rd Moment of Uncertainty: Skew 
4th Moment of Uncertainty: Kurtosis 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
In a next step, we construct aggregate measures of uncertainty across the different economic agents. For the aggregate 
first moment and second moment, we use principal component analysis to combine the different point estimates13 
(factor loadings: Consumer 32%, Corporates 35%, Financial Markets 33%) and the standard deviation (factor loadings: 
Consumer 15%, Corporates 39%, Financial Markets 46%). The study refers to principal component analysis to describe 
the systemic nature of uncertainty expressed through the factor loadings of the first principal vector that explains most 
of the variation in the data. Hence, the first moment emerges almost equally from the three different economic groups, 
while the dispersion around the point estimate applies a higher weight to the dispersion within the corporate sector and 
financial markets. For the aggregate measures of the skewness and kurtosis, the study uses equal weighting given a later 
starting date of the financial time series and the decision to not standardize skewness and kurtosis given the more useful 
interpretation of their original scaling.  
This model set-up yields four aggregate indices representing the different moments of uncertainty. Each aggregate 
moment is made up of three sub-indices covering the different economic agents.  
3.3 Construction of the VAR and the Impulse Response Functions 
To estimate the impact of uncertainty on real GDP, we construct a VAR that includes two additional real economic 
variables reflecting broader business cycle dynamics and the four moments of uncertainty: 
 










































+ 𝜀𝑡                                 [4] 
 
The four moments of uncertainty, 1stU, 2ndU, 3rdU, 4thU, represent the aggregate vectors across the three different 
economic groups. For all real economic variables, the study considers the quarterly difference of the natural logarithm. 
For GDP, we include a measure of real GDP. For IP, we consider the Industrial Production Index excluding construction. 
For π , the analysis refers to a measure of core inflation represented by the HICP excluding Energy & Unprocessed 
Food. We further test for four lags of the VAR representation. 
                                                        
13 The option-adjusted-spread for corporate bonds is not available before Q3 2000, hence, we combine the corporate 
and the consumer via a simple average until that point. 
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To infer the predictive value of each moment of uncertainty on real GDP via impulse response functions, we apply a 
one-standard deviation shock to the innovations of each uncertainty vector. We use the Cholesky decomposition of the 
covariance matrix and order the variables based on our hypothesis of the degree of endogeneity.14  
3.4 Out-of-Sample Assessment of Forecast Accuracy 
In order to assess whether the different moments of uncertainty contribute to the forecasting quality of the model, we 
estimate rolling out-of-sample GDP forecasts for the one quarter horizon. We proceed by estimating the VAR from Q1 
1999 until Q1 2008 which is the last quarter before growth of real GDP hits negative territory. We start by forecasting 
GDP for the next quarter and calculate the root sum squared error term: 
 
                𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑡 𝑆𝑢𝑚 𝑆𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 = √




                         [5] 
 
We repeat the same exercise moving one quarter forward while keeping the starting date of the VAR fixed at Q1 1999 
until we reach Q1 2018. The variable n represents the number of forecasts which is 41 for this set-up. We estimate this 
forecast error for 5 different models. The benchmark model represents a parsimonious definition containing only the 
three real economic variables. Models 2 to 5 include an increasing number of uncertainty vectors beginning with the 
first moment and adding stepwise the standard deviation, the skewness and the kurtosis. 
3.5 Validation of Results 
A common argument in literature is the dominant effect of the point estimate of confidence on the latter moments of 
uncertainty. If we observe that any of the latter moments (standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis) increases the 
model‟s forecasting accuracy, we will examine whether this effect is primarily driven by the first moment or by a 
genuine exogenous shock coming from the particular moment itself. Following a purging procedure described in 
Hatzius et al. (2010), we estimate a linear OLS regression model with the respective latter moment as the determinant 
variable and the first moment as the explanatory variable. We interpret the standardized error terms as the latter moment 
purged of the first moment and re-estimate the out-of-sample forecasting model. 
4. Results 
In a first step, we describe the nature of the different moments of uncertainty qualitatively vis-à-vis the business cycle. 
Secondly, we shock the different uncertainty variables by one standard deviation of their innovations and examine the 
effect on GDP. Third, we assess whether adding different moments of uncertainty increases the forecast accuracy of a 
VAR model via rolling out-of-sample forecasts and validate subsequently the results with regard to potential 
endogeneity. 
4.1 Behavior of the Different Moments 
All four moments are negatively correlated with GDP ranging from -0.77 to -0.05. In line with our initial assumption, 
an increase of each moment is associated with a decrease in GDP growth for the first three moments and less conclusive 
results for the fourth moment (see Table 2 and Figures 1 and 2 for this). 
 
Table 2. Correlation of Variables 
  Real GDP IP Core Inflation 1st Moment 2nd Moment 3rd Moment 
Real GDP 1,00 0,89 -0,07 -0,77 -0,59 -0,38 
IP 0,89 1,00 -0,09 -0,59 -0,51 -0,31 
Core Inflation -0,07 -0,09 1,00 -0,05 0,06 0,16 
1st Moment -0,77 -0,59 -0,05 1,00 0,62 0,50 
2nd Moment -0,59 -0,51 0,06 0,62 1,00 0,10 
3rd Moment -0,38 -0,31 0,16 0,50 0,10 1,00 





                                                        
14 We assume that the real economic variables have a higher degree of endogeneity. 






























Figure 2. Third and Fourth Moment of Uncertainty 
 
The first moment of uncertainty [Figure 3] peaks three times during the last 20 years and tracks closely the GDP 
dynamics with a correlation of -0.77. Not only does the first moment reflect all three periods where economic growth 
turned negative (the economic contraction in Q1 2003, the Global financial crisis (GFC), the European peripheral debt 
crisis), but it also captures the magnitude of each of these economic periods very well. The index reaches its highest 
level during the GFC by increasing to 3.2 standard deviations above historical levels. From its through in Q2 2007, the 
index needs 7 quarters to hit its global peak in Q1 2009. This period coincides with the steepest quarterly decline of 
GDP during the GFC of -3%. During the European peripheral debt crisis, the amplitude of the index is more contained 
at 1 standard deviation above historical levels, representing the second largest peak. However, the first moment 
maintains an average level of 1 standard deviation for approx. 7 quarters which reflects strained confidence levels until 
the preliminary resolve through concerted action taken by the ECB and the European Commission. The third largest 
peak of the index occurs in Q1 2003, when growth of the euro area was lingering in negative territory for about a 
quarter. In line with the mild level of economic distress at that time, the uncertainty index enters positive territory but 
peaks already at 0.4 standard deviations. For the rest of the period, the index remains below zero without major 
fluctuations which underlines the benign economic periods between Q4 2003 to Q4 2007 and Q2 2013 to Q2 2018. The 
qualitative assessment of the first moment lends support to the hypothesis that the underlying input factors are largely 
representative of business cycle dynamics. 
 
 
















Figure 3. Decomposition of the First Moment of Uncertainty 
 
The second moment of uncertainty [Figure 4] is also strongly negatively correlated with GDP growth at -0.59. Given 
that the calculation of the first and the second moment was conducted based on the same dataset (with the exception of 
financial data), we interpret the second moment as the level of conviction that consumers, corporates and financial 
markets have about their first moment confidence estimate. Considering positive correlation of 0.62 between the first 
and the second moment, the observer is inclined to associate periods of high uncertainty with higher dispersion around 
the point estimate. On the same note, periods of lower uncertainty are associated with higher unanimity in the outlook. 
However, as we deconstruct this summary statistic into sub-periods, we learn that the overall positive correlation 
between the first and the second moment of uncertainty can be split into a pre-crisis period before the GFC exhibiting 
actually negative correlation and a period with very strong co-movement thereafter. For the period between Q1 1999 
and Q4 2007, results indicate a correlation of -0.17 which highlights that the second moment did not behave 
pro-cyclically. During the first years after the formation of the euro area, the point estimate of uncertainty (first moment) 
shows generally high confidence among economic agents. The second moment, however, reveals a sustained higher 
dispersion around this estimate and disagreement within the corporate sector, among consumers and on financial 
markets lingering below the surface. In fact, the high level of dispersion around this estimate is only surpassed by the 














Figure 4. Decomposition of the Second Moment of Uncertainty 
 
Looking at the period from Q1 2008 to Q2 2018, the correlation of both moments changes substantially and stands at 
0.83. The strong increase of uncertainty during the GFC coincides with less consensus among economic agents about 
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their confidence estimate. We observe similar co-movement of both moments for the time period between Q2 2015 and 
Q2 2018 with a correlation of even 0.90. Despite potentially disruptive events (e.g. Brexit, U.S. election in 2016, the 
Greek debt crisis), both indices remain consistently low which underlines a high degree of unanimity among economic 
agents. In order to validate our initial belief of a structural break in the relationship between both time series, we 
conduct a test for structural change (Chow, 1960) that assumes that the first moment is explanatory for the second 
moment15. The model supports our initial assumption of a structural break in Q1 2008 (last quarter before negative GDP 
growth) and rejects the null hypothesis of coefficient stability at the 1% significance level. 
The third moment [Figure 5] is negatively correlated with GDP at -0.38 and positively correlated with the first and 
second moment of uncertainty. Providing insights into the symmetry of the distribution, positive skewness is associated 
with negative growth. During periods of benign economic conditions, we tend to observe a moderately left skew with 
only a few outliers on the left-hand side of the distribution. As most markets participants gather on the positive 
spectrum, this creates ample room on the left-hand side of the confidence distribution for outliers who create the 
respective skew. When the crisis hits, people tend to revise their confidence level downward and collective herd 
behavior forces the median to fall below the mean of the distribution. At later stages of a crisis, the sustained positive 
skew is likely to be driven by positive outliers on the right-hand side who expect improving economic prospects16. Over 
the last two decades, we can observe positive skewness peaking three times. These local maxima coincide again with 
the three economic downturns that also come with the spike in the first moment. However, the nature and amplitude of 
these increases differ with the European peripheral debt crisis representing the most persistent positive skewness. 
During the period between Q1 2011 and Q1 2013, the positive skewness continuously rises while the first moment 
remains steadily at the same uncertainty level. A similar gradual increase of the positive skew is evident during the GFC, 














Figure 5. Decomposition of the Third Moment of Uncertainty 
 
The fourth moment of uncertainty has a correlation of -0.05 with GDP growth and a correlation between -0.14 and 0.18 
with the three other moments of uncertainty [Figure 6]. Hence, it appears to be almost uncorrelated with the business 
cycle. Over the last two decades, there is only the period between Q3 2011 and Q2 2013 in which the fourth moment 
attributes a persistent leptokurtic shape to uncertainty. This suggest that most of the economic agents have gathered 
around the points estimate with a few extreme outliers. The latter characteristic could be explained by the very binary 
nature of the redenomination risks that were surfacing during the European peripheral debt crisis. In contrast, the period 
leading up towards the GFC and the economic downturn itself did not coincide with a higher dispersion of confidence 
estimates in the tails.  
 
                                                        
15 As literature often assumes that the first moment has an effect on the second moment of the distribution, we model 
the Chow test with the first moment as the explanatory variable. 
16 For the financial time series, periods of crisis show also a right skew with extreme outliers on the upper volatility 
spectrum. 















Figure 6. Decomposition of the Fourth Moment of Uncertainty 
 
4.2 The Effect of Uncertainty on GDP Growth 
The impulse response function is based on a VAR with a lag structure of 2 based on the AIC criterion. This result 
suggests that uncertainty and real economic variables impact one another with a lag of up to 6 months. To further 
examine the role of the various economic groups, we differentiate in a second step between consumers, corporates and 
financial markets. 
A one-standard deviation shock to the first moment of uncertainty [Figure 7] leads to a cumulative decline in GDP of 
-1.1% over the first two years. While the effect during the first year is -0.9%, the impulse on GDP leaves negative 
territory by the 8th quarter and leads to some degree of growth overshooting in the annual range of 0.2 % before it dies 
out after additional 3 years. As the overshooting makes up for around half of the growth detraction, the model suggests 
that an uncertainty shock has a persisting effect on the level of GDP but not on the growth rate. An innovation to the 
second moment leads to a cumulative decline of GDP by -0.6% over the first two years with a subsequent moderate 
overshooting of growth. Results mirror the findings for the first moment, however, with a lower amplitude. Even though 
the impulse response function for a shock on the third moment of uncertainty shows overall similar dynamics in its 
impulse on GDP, the effect is significantly lower in absolute terms (-0.1% of GDP in the first year). With regard to the 















Figure 7. Impulse Response Function and Effect on GDP 
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Decomposing the shock to the first moment of uncertainty into the vectors‟ three subcomponents through individual 
impulse response functions, we can attribute the largest impact to the corporate sector by -1% GDP growth in the first 
year [Figure 8]. Interestingly, financial markets exert a similarly sized shock in the first quarter, however, the effect is 















Figure 8. Decomposition of the Impulse Response Function (First Moment) 
 
With regard to the decomposition of the second moment of uncertainty, results confirm that a financial markets shock is 
again less persistent in its effect on the real economy compared to an impulse stemming from the other two economic 
agents [Figure 9]. Despite the overall lower amplitude, the consistency across the different agents lends credibility to 















Figure 9. Decomposition of the Impulse Response Function (Second Moment) 
 
5. Predictive Value of Uncertainty in GDP Forecasts 
In this section, we examine how the addition of the four moments affects the VAR model‟s forecast accuracy on real 
GDP growth over the one-period horizon and subsequently test for the role of endogeneity. 
5.1 Results of the Different Forecasting Models 
We estimate four VAR models starting with the three real economic variables and the first moment of uncertainty. For 
Applied Economics and Finance                                          Vol. 7, No. 6; 2020 
15 
 
each additional model, we add another moment of uncertainty until we reach the full specification as outlined in section 
3.3. The initial calibration considers the period between Q1 1999 and Q1 2008, which represents the last quarter before 
growth turned into negative territory during the recession of 2008-2009. We re-estimate the model by adding one 
additional quarter until we reach Q1 2018 and assess the root sum squared error term. To evaluate the relative 
performance, the study considers first a parsimonious benchmark model based on the three real economic variables 
[Table 3]. 
 
Table 3. Results of the Forecasting Models 






















Recession       
2008-2009 




X X X         0,81 2,03 0,27 
Model 1 X X X X       0,65 1,42 0,53 
Model 2 X X X X X     0,63 1,38 0,60 
Model 3 X X X X X X   0,68 1,50 0,58 
Model 4 X X X X X X X 0,70 1,54 0,62 
 
The benchmark model produces a root sum squared error of 0.81 [Figure 10]. The reason for this relatively large 
forecast error can be traced back to the GFC between Q1 2008 and Q3 2009, which yields on an isolated basis a root 
sum squared error of 2.02. As the calibration period between Q1 1999 and Q1 2008 does not include a major downturn, 
the model‟s error term is rather large for the first economic contraction. For the second recession caused by the 
European peripheral debt crisis, the forecast accuracy of the model improves significantly yielding only a forecast error 














Figure 10. GDP Forecast – Benchmark Model, Model 1 and Model 2 
 
The addition of the first moment of uncertainty (Model 1) improves the forecast accuracy over the total horizon 
substantially and generates a root sum squared error of 0.65. This is due to a better performance during the first 
recession with error statistics of 1.42. The GDP forecast of Model 1 turns south to -3.03% in Q1 2009 (actual growth 
-3.02%) versus a forecast of -2.11% based on the benchmark model. Hence, the first moment of uncertainty seems to 
adequately capture the amplitude of the recession during the GFC. However, Model 1 fails to capture the quick rebound 
of growth back to -0.24% in the subsequent quarter. Model 2, which incorporates both the first and second moment of 
uncertainty, improves the forecast accuracy further with an error term of 0.63. The addition of the third moment and the 
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fourth moment of uncertainty, however, decreases the model quality with an error term of 0.68 for Model 3 and 0.70 for 













Figure 11. GDP Forecast – Benchmark Model, Model 3 and Model 4 
 
We conclude that augmenting the benchmark model with the first moment of uncertainty clearly yields a significant 
improvement. On the addition of the second moment, we remain cautious and further investigate the relationship 
between the first and the second moment of uncertainty in the next section.  
5.2 Purging for the Exogenous Component of the Second Moment  
Results of the previous section provide some evidence that the second moment increases the forecasting ability of the 
VAR model on GDP growth. However, the question arises to what degree the dynamics of the second moment are 
actually driven by the first moment of uncertainty. To purge the second moment from the effect of the point estimate of 
confidence, we apply a regression method used by Hatzius et al. (2010). We estimate a linear OLS regression model 
with the second moment as the determinant variable and the first moment as the explanatory variable. Results suggest 
that 31% of the second moment can be explained by variation of the first moment. For the perspective of this analysis, 













Figure 12. The Exogenous Component of the 2nd Moment of Uncertainty 
The purged index reveals that the highest degree of dispersion occurs in the early days of the newly formed euro area. 
The levels are comparable to the heightened dispersion during the GFC. According to this revised index of the second 
moment, the dispersion of uncertainty during the European peripheral debt crisis was even below historical averages 
and rises again into positive territory during the flare-up of recession fears between Q3 2015 and Q2 2016. To quantify 
the predictive value of the purged index, we re-estimate Model 2 by replacing the second moment by the purged index 
of the second moment. The root sum squared error of the rolling GDP forecast remains at 0.63 which is consistent with 
the results of the unpurged version. Hence, we conclude that the second moment carries additional informative value 
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that is not captured in the first moment of uncertainty. 
5. Conclusion  
We construct four different moments of aggregate uncertainty across consumers, corporates and financials markets. All 
four moments are negatively correlated with GDP growth with correlation coefficients ranging from -0.77 to -0.05 in 
increasing order. The qualitative assessment of the first moment lends support to the idea that point estimates of the 
confidence level are strongly representative of business cycle dynamics. The second moment of uncertainty is also 
strongly negatively correlated with GDP and displays how unanimous economic agents are about their point estimate. 
The analysis of the third moment reveals that positive skewness is associated with negative growth. While the initial 
increase of the skewness is probably driven by herd behavior, the continuous increase during a crisis could reflect 
optimistic outliers who act as harbingers for the recovery. The assessment of the fourth moment does not allow for firm 
conclusions about its relationship with the business cycle.  
By quantifying the impact of uncertainty, impulse response functions suggest that a one-standard deviation shock to the 
innovations of the first moment of uncertainty leads to an initial cumulative decline in GDP of -1.1% over the first two 
years which is reduced by half due to an overshoot of GDP growth over the subsequent years. This causes a permanent 
effect on the level of GDP, but only a temporary effect on the growth rate. By decomposing the shock on the first 
moment of uncertainty into its three sectors, we can attribute the largest impact to the corporate sector and observe the 
effect of financial markets being equally strong in the beginning but fading much quicker. A shock to the second and 
third moment of uncertainty causes similar dynamics like the first moment but with lower amplitude, whereas the 
kurtosis is negligible with regard to the impact on GDP growth.  
We conclude that augmenting a parsimonious forecasting model on GDP by the first and second moment of uncertainty 
clearly improves overall forecast accuracy. As we remove the potential effect of the first moment on the second moment 
through a purging procedure, we can verify that the second moment carries informational value that is independent of 
the first moment improving the forecasting model further. 
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